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Abstract
An increasing international applicability of a given type of education en-
courages students to invest more eﬀort when studying. Governments, on the
other hand, face an incentive to divert the provision of public education away
from internationally applicable education toward country-speciﬁc skills. This
would mean educating too few engineers, economists and doctors, and too many
lawyers. If the total tax rate is kept constant, then replacing part of existing
wage taxes with graduate taxes or income-contingent loans, collected also from
migrants, would improve eﬃciency. It could even allow for a Pareto-improvement.
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11. Introduction
There is wide political consensus within the European Union that decisions on
public education should be left to individual member states. Beneﬁt s ,h o w e v e r ,a c c r u e
partly to other member states through migration. By providing skilled immigrants,
investments in internationally applicable education generate positive externalities to
other member states. As individual member states have no incentives to internalize
these externalities, decentralized decision-making tends to lead into ineﬃciently low
investments in internationally applicable degrees. Increased mobility of the highly
educated generates incentives to scale back public ﬁnancing, recently exempliﬁed in
the introduction of top-up fees in England. Before that Sweden replaced a system of
income-contingent loans, in eﬀect between 1989 and 2001, by ordinary annuity loans.
(CSN 2002). Sweden abandoning its income-contingent loan system may reﬂect the
pressures of increased labor mobility. Of all of those who graduate from Swedish
universities, 15 percent emigrate. (Eklund 1998). Unlike income-contingent loans,
annuity loans do not require cooperation from foreign tax authorities. Migration also
t e n d st ob ec o n c e n t r a t e di nc e r t a i nﬁelds. For example, 5.8 percent of Finnish working-
age doctors and 5.0 percent of nurses lived abroad in 2001. (Vaalgamaa and Ohtonen
2002) The share of the members of the Finnish Association of Graduates in Economics
and Business Administration (SEFE) living abroad is 4 percent. (Oksanen 2002)
Even though the possibility of migration reduces the incentives of individual gov-
ernments to provide internationally applicable education, it also encourages students
to study more intensively, by increasing the expected returns to human capital. Pri-
vate eﬀort and public provision are complements in the formation of human capital.
Increased complementary investments by students may also encourage more public
2investments.
This paper examines the eﬀe c t so fm i g r a t i o no nt h ep r o v i s i o no fc o u n t r y - s p e c i ﬁc
and internationally applicable public education when public and private investments
in human capital are complements. Including these two aspects of human capital for-
mation allows evaluation of whether the brain gain eﬀect would swamp the brain drain
eﬀect in the public provision of education, so that an increased mobility would result
in higher public investment. The framework used allows the member states of the
common labor market, from now on referred to as federation, to diﬀer in general pro-
d u c t i v i t y .T h ea n a l y s i sc o n s i d e r sb o t ht h ec a s ei nw h i c hm e m b e rs t a t e sl e v yo n l yw a g e
taxes on their residents, and also a case in which member states levy also graduate
taxes or income-contingent loans which are paid to the country which provided edu-
cation independently of future domicile. Graduate tax is used to denote a tax which
is collected from university graduates, without a requirement that tax revenue col-
lected from them would have to equal the costs of providing education. Such graduate
taxes give the country which educated migrants a stake also in their productivity gains
earned elsewhere. Income-contingent loans, on the other hand, are collected as a share
of future income, until the education is fully repaid. This study focuses on education
targeted to young adults.1
Income-contingent loans would allow reducing the wage tax burden, at the same
time allowing students to purchase insurance against the risk of low income. In the
absence of uncertainty, they could eﬀectively reproduce the same outcome as private
investment in education. The analysis of this paper focuses on graduate taxes, as the
1In the spirit of Tiebout (1956), parents valuing education may buy better education for their
children by paying higher taxes. Such a mechanism is much weaker in higher education, as young
adults may go to a university in a diﬀerent city, or even country, than in which their parents pay
taxes.
3framework does not include uncertainty. The advantages of income-contingent loans as
a policy recommendation, as opposed to graduate taxes, are discussed in conclusion.
The main advantage is that voluntary income-contingent loans would better protect
citizens against a possibility of government exploitation, allowing students to opt out
of contracts they consider unattractive.
The main results are the following. If there are no graduate taxes (or income-
contingent loans) and governments care only about the citizens who stay, then gov-
ernments tend to reduce investment in internationally applicable education when its
applicability increases. If a government attaches a suﬃciently high positive weight
also on the utility of emigrants, then it might increase investment in internationally
applicable education when it becomes more mobile. Independently of the weight at-
tached to emigrants and of the productivity diﬀerential between the two countries,
replacing part of the current wage taxes by a graduate tax (or income-contingent loan)
always leads to higher welfare and more eﬃcient investment in internationally applica-
ble education than the current system, provided that the aggregate tax rate does not
increase. In addition, this study ﬁnds that the welfare eﬀects of labor mobility may be
non-monotonic. For the sake of argument, consider rich and poor member states of the
European Union. Increasing international applicability of human capital beneﬁts rich
member states by allowing them to attract skilled workers from poor member states.
However, if migrating to a rich member state becomes very attractive, this may dis-
courage the government of the poor member state to provide citizens internationally
applicable education. The rich member state would also be hurt by losing a base of
potential immigrants.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews literature. Section 3 develops
the model. Section 4 presents the results, and section 5 concludes.
42. Literature review
A key question in ﬁscal federalism literature is whether decentralized outcomes are
eﬃcient or not, and whether centralization would increase or decrease welfare. Justman
and Thisse (1997) show that a government that maximizes the utility of immobile
residents reduces investment in public education when the educated become mobile.
Their model includes only one type of education. Another ineﬃciency is identiﬁed by
Wildasin (2000). When the highly-skilled become mobile, tax competition tends to
erode any taxes they have to pay. This shifts the burden of ﬁnancing public education
to immobile tax bases. If taxation relies heavily on less mobile and less educated
workers, then public education would imply regressive redistribution. It seems unlikely
outcome, in that governments must gain political support from the citizens staying.2
Brain drain literature, pioneered by Grubel and Scott (1966) and Bhagwati and
Hamada (1974), highlights the losses that emigration imposes on source countries. This
view has been questioned by recent literature, suggesting that emigration may beneﬁt
the source country. Stark et al. (1997) show that when students invest privately in their
human capital, some migration from developing countries to developed countries may
actually beneﬁt the country of origin. The mechanism is as follows. A possibility to
migrate to a richer country increases the expected return to human capital investment
in a poor country, thus encouraging private investment. Even with a part of high-skilled
workers migrating, this initial brain gain may dominate, so that the less developed
country can end up with a higher average level of human capital per worker with
migration than without it. The empirical analysis by Beine et al. (2001) shows that
2Ad i ﬀerent view on tax competition may arise if governments cannot commit to taxation, either
explicitly or implicitly. Andersson and Konrad (2003) and Thum and Uebelmesser (2003) suggest
that labor mobility could increase investment in education as it serves as a commitment device to low
taxation. Recently, also Haupt and Janeba (2004) have studied the eﬀect of migration on education
and redistribution in the absence of commitment.
5such a beneﬁcial brain drain cannot be ruled out. Finally, Stark and Wang (2002)
show that a possibility of migration to a richer country may serve as a substitute for
subsidies for human capital formation, thus potentially beneﬁting also the country of
emigration. These contributions focus on private investment in human capital, and
they study the use of migration quotas by less developed countries. This study focuses
on public provision of education, in the presence of complementary private investment.
It assumes that there are no legal restrictions to migration, consistent with the EU
principles of free mobility.
Also Poutvaara (2004) studies public and private provision of diﬀerent types of ed-
ucation with diﬀerent tax rules. This paper diﬀers in three respects. First, Poutvaara
(2004) assumes that human capital depends only on individual ability and public in-
vestment in education, while this paper allows human capital to depend also on private
investment in eﬀort. Including simultaneously complementary public and private in-
vestments in human capital allows analysis of whether the brain drain eﬀect could be
swamped by the brain gain eﬀect in the public provision of education. This study con-
siders both the extensive margin of how many students are educated, and the intensive
margin of how much they invest in their eﬀort, and how much human capital is gener-
ated. Second, Poutvaara (2004) models only a federation of symmetric member states,
while this paper allows member states to diﬀer. Allowing for diﬀerent productivities is
important to allow comparisons with the brain gain literature, which has focused on
unilateral migration from poor to rich countries. Third, Poutvaara (2004) allows for
externalities, while this paper derives its results in the absence of externalities.
63. The model
3.1. Game structure
A federation consists of two member states, labeled A and B. Both member states
are populated by overlapping generations of heterogeneous citizens who become ed-
ucated and work, and by recipients of government transfers who neither participate
in production nor migrate. Each citizen lives for two periods, becoming educated in
his or her member state of birth in the ﬁrst period, and choosing where to live, work
and pay taxes in the second period. There are two types of education, labeled i and
s. These subscripts refer to whether the education is internationally applicable (i)
or country-speciﬁc( s). Only those with internationally applicable education may mi-
grate. Students with ability-intensive internationally applicable education may also
invest privately eﬀort in their education. Such investment cannot be veriﬁed by the
government.
The education is provided publicly. To focus on government decisions on what
type of education to provide, it is assumed that the tax rates are exogenous and the
same in the two member states.3 T h eg o v e r n m e n tb u d g e tc o n s t r a i n ti sb a l a n c e db y
adjusting transfers to the rest of the population. The governments have two diﬀerent
tax instruments: A general wage tax rate τw,t is levied on all wage income generated
domestically in period t, while there may also be a graduate tax rate τg,t,p a i db y
graduates to the member state which initially provided their education. In other words,
also migrants pay their graduate taxes to their member state of origin. The total tax
rate is then τt = τw,t + τg,t,s a t i s f y i n gτw,t ≥ 0,τg,t ≥ 0,τt < 1.G o v e r n m e n t s a r e
3Keen and Marchand (1997) use the same assumption when they study the eﬀect of ﬁscal compe-
tition on the composition of public expenditure in the presence of mobile capital. They ﬁnd that in a
non-cooperative equilibrium, public expenditures are biased toward the provision of public inputs at
the expense of local public goods beneﬁting immobile residents.
7benevolent, choosing the education that maximizes the after-tax consumption of their
remaining citizens, and possibly attaching a positive weight also on their migrating
citizens. The values of all exogenous parameters with time index are known at least
one period ahead, allowing for both a steady-state and a transition path.
The timing of actions in each period is as follows. First, those entering their sec-
ond period of life with internationally applicable education learn what would be their
wage in the other member state, then deciding whether to migrate or not. Second,
governments decide on the provision of public education. Third, the educated supply
labor and pay taxes, and the government collects wage taxes and ﬁnances education.
Fourth, those becoming educated decide on their investment in eﬀort.4
3.2. Production
The production function is linear in the two types of human capital. Aggregate
production in member state A in period t is given by Y A
t = HA
i,t + HA
s,t,i nw h i c hHA
k,t,
k ∈ {i,s}, is the post-migration stock of eﬀective human capital of type k,a sd e ﬁned in
the following subsection. Labor markets are competitive, so that gross rates of return
to human capital of both types are equal to unity. Income diﬀerences then follow
from diﬀerent amounts of human capital. Aggregate production in member state B in
period t is given by Y B
t = xtHB
i,t+xtHB
s,t,i nw h i c hHB
k,t, k ∈ {i,s},i st h ep o s t - m i g r a t i o n
stock of eﬀective human capital of type k. Without loss of generality, it is assumed
that 0 <x t ≤ 1. This formulation allows for both a symmetric and an asymmetric
federation.
Citizens diﬀer in their productivity if they would complete education i,w h i l et h e y
4The results would remain the same with an alternative ordering of events, as long as migration
decisions are made after potential migrants know their productivity elsewhere, and migration takes
place before supplying labor.
8have identical productivity if they would complete education s.H u m a n c a p i t a l o f
type i is a joint product of teaching and studying.5 For a citizen with ability a and
individual eﬀort et−1 in period t − 1, the individual human capital stock is before
eventual migration in period t
hi,t(a,et−1)=a + et−1. (1)
Human capital with education of type s is for all individuals normalized to unity:
hs,t(a)=1 .
The monetarized cost of eﬀort et is βe2
t. This formulation of an increasing mar-
ginal cost guarantees a bounded investment in e. The resource cost for universities of
education k,k ∈ {i,s}, is ck,t in member state A and xtck,t in member state B. The
assumption that the government’s costs of providing education in member state B are
a multiplicative xt of those in state A captures the stylized fact that as a signiﬁcant
part of the costs of providing education are wage costs, an increase in the general level
of productivity also causes an increase in the cost of providing education.
Ability a follows, in both member states, a continuous distribution between 0 and
a,w i t hd e n s i t yf u n c t i o nf(a). It is assumed that a>1 and that parameter values are
such that at least the government of member state A always invests in both types of
human capital. The utility of the educated is linear in their consumption, net of the
monetarized eﬀort cost of investment in education, and all consumption takes place in
the second period.
5All results would hold if also human capital of type s would be a joint product of teaching and
studying.
93.3. Migration
As h a r eγt of internationally applicable education in one member state is applicable
in the other member state in case of migration, satisfying 0 <γ t ≤ 1. Each individual
faces an individual-speciﬁc random component related to productivity abroad, un-
known to the government and the individual before investing in education but known
to the individual before migration. The random component takes a multiplicative form
1+ε,s ot h a tε is uniformly distributed between −0.5 and 0.5. Some individuals would
then lose an individual-speciﬁc share of their productivity in case they emigrate, while
others would beneﬁtf r o mab o o s ti nt h e i rp r o d u c t i v i t ya b r o a d .T h i sa l l o w sf o rap o s -
sibility of mutually beneﬁcial brain exchange between countries, helping to capture
the stylized fact that there is often migration of people with same education in both
directions.
A productivity diﬀerential between the member states if xt < 1 would further
motivate migration from member state B to member state A. At the same time, it would
increase the threshold value of the positive random term needed to induce migration
from member state A to member state B. An individual with internationally applicable
education would then emigrate from member state A to member state B if and only if
γt(1 + ε)xt > 1, (2)
and from member state B to member state A if and only if γt(1 + ε) >x t.P a r a m e t e r
values xt and γt are assumed to satisfy xt >γ t/2,γt > 2/3.T h e ﬁrst assumption
guarantees that not everyone with internationally applicable education emigrates from
member state B. The second assumption guarantees that there is at least some migra-
tion between symmetric member states, that is with xt =1 . With these assumptions,
10(2) deﬁnes the cutoﬀ level of εA
t =m i n ( 1 /(γtxt) − 1, 1
2) below which citizens with in-
ternationally applicable educationr e m a i ni nm e m b e rs t a t eAi np e r i o dt. Therefore,
there is no migration from member state A if γtxt ≤ 2/3. Correspondingly, the cutoﬀ
level below which citizens remain in member state B is given by εB
t = xt/γt − 1.F o r
simplicity, ε is assumed to not be correlated with individual ability a. By this assump-
tion and the properties of a uniform distribution, the share of remaining internationally
applicable human capital is given by F(ε
j
t).
When there is also some migration from member state A, F(ε
j
t)=1 /(xtγt) − 1/2
is the share of those with education i who do not migrate. The probability that an










As long as xtγt > 2/3, there is emigration from member state A. The probability
of emigration reaches its peak of 0.5 when γt =1and xt =1 . The probability of










As migration occurs only when the productivity of migrants is higher in the other
member state, brain exchange increases the aggregate production. Note that the pro-
ductivity of all migrants with education i is higher in their new member state of resi-
dence, as otherwise they would not migrate in the ﬁrst place. The average productivity













If γtxx ≤ 2/3, there is no migration as pA
t =0 ,a n dt h u sbA
t is not determined in
the model. To simplify future notation, bA
t =1if pA
t =0 . The average productivity










If the member states are identical, that is, xt =1 , the average productivity multi-
plier is the same for migrants from both member states. The productivity multiplier
reports the average post-migration productivity of the pre-migration human capital
of migrants. The average productivity of migrants from member state A is bA
t times
as high in member state B as it would have been in member state A. The average
productivity of migrants from member state B is bB
t /xt t i m e sa sh i g hi nm e m b e rs t a t e
A as it would have been in member state B.
3.4. Private investment in education
By (1), (3) and (5), a student in internationally applicable education in member








t (1 − τt)b
A






provided that there is a positive probability of migration, that is pA
t > 0.T h eﬁrst two
6With ε being uniformly distributed between −0.5 and 0.5, the highest value of 1+ε is 3
2, while
the lowest value with migration is 1+ε1
t = 1
xtγt.
12terms are the discounted value of expected future after-tax income, with an individual
discount factor ρ, 0 <ρ≤ 1. The third term is the immediate eﬀort cost. This

















t =0 ,t h e nt h eo p t i m a le ﬀort choice is eA
t−1 =( 1− τt)ρ/(2β).
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B



















The equations (7) and (8) imply that the investment in eﬀort by students receiving
education i is increasing in xt and in γt in both member states.
3.5. Public education and aggregate production
The government has access to entrance examinations which allow it to screen ap-
plicants to the ability-intensive education. While not used in all countries, entrance
examinations or results from end-of-school tests are commonly used to select those
who are admitted. The cutoﬀ level of ability chosen by the government j, j ∈ {A,B},
is denoted in period t by a
j
t, below which citizens are educated in ﬁeld s and above






















The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side reports that part of education i which depends
on individual ability, and the second term the part determined by individual eﬀort.
Post-migration internationally applicable human capital in member state j consists of
share (1 − p
j
t) of domestically created human capital and human capital of those who
have immigrated from member state k, k 6= j:
H
j











The government in each member state collects wage taxes at rate τw,t and graduate
taxes at rate τg,t from the educated to ﬁnance exogenous public consumption G
j
t and
public education, and returns the rest of the tax revenue to citizens not participating
in production, like the elderly. The transfer in member state j is Tj.T h eg o v e r n m e n t


















t + csF(b a
A
t )+ci(1 − F(b a
A
t )) + T
A
t
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t + xtcsF(b a
B
t )+xtci(1 − F(b a
B
t )) + T
B
t .
14The left-hand side is the government budget revenue. The ﬁrst term gives wage tax
revenue from the educated residing in the country, and the second term graduate tax
revenue from those who received their education in the country. The right-hand side
reports the expenditures, consisting of the exogenous revenue requirement, the costs of




Even when restricting the analysis to a utilitarian government, important questions
remain. First, how does the government value the utility of diﬀerent generations? As
current education aﬀects future production capacity and income, the government faces
an intergenerational trade-oﬀ. Second, how does the government value the utility of
emigrants and immigrants?
The analysis proceeds under the following assumptions. The government values
the current consumption and the future income that investment in education generates
for its citizens in the following period, using the same discount rate as individuals.
The government values the after-tax income of its emigrating citizens, compared to
the income of remaining citizens, at rate α, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. The government weights
the graduate tax revenue that it is able to collect from emigrants in the same way
as it values the income of its remaining citizens. The privately chosen eﬀort cost
of students with internationally applicable education does not enter into government
decision-making. The government attaches a zero weight to immigrants.7 The social
7Importantly, the results are independent of whether the government also values the utility of
immigrants or not. The assumption of zero weight simpliﬁes notation.
15welfare function is given by
SWF
A
t =( 1 − τt)H
A
s,t +( 1− p
A































The ﬁrst line gives the utility of consumption in the current period of those citizens
who stay, being the sum of the disposable income of those with education s,t h o s e
with education i, and transfers to the rest of the population. The second line gives the
sum of the discounted value of production of those citizens who stay, and graduate tax
revenue from the emigrants. The allocation of these resources between consumption
and investment in education are decided only in the following period. The third line
reports the social valuation of the utility of emigrants. The ﬁrst term is the valuation
of the consumption of the emigrants in the current period, and the second term is the
discounted value of the consumption of emigrants in the following period.
As the tax rates are given, the consumption of the educated in the current period
is exogenous from the government’s perspective. Omitting this and other exogenous

























The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side consists of current transfers to the rest of
the population. These are directly aﬀected by the costs of education currently pro-
vided. The second term is the discounted value of the income accruing to those with
16country-speciﬁc education in the following period. As the government values the in-
come accruing to diﬀerent groups of citizens in the same way, this term does not depend
on future taxation. The third term is the discounted value of income accruing to those
with internationally applicable education who stay. The fourth term is the discounted
social valuation of the after-tax income of emigrants. The ﬁfth term is the discounted



























This section focuses on education policy when no changes in taxes or productivity
diﬀerential x are expected in the following period. For simplicity, the time indices from
the tax rates and parameters x,pA,p B,b A and bB are omitted.
4.1. Welfare eﬀects of graduate taxes
Governments choose the cutoﬀ levels of ability that maximizes their objective func-
tions. Diﬀerentiating SWF
A
t with respect to aA
t g i v e sa st h eﬁrst-order condition













t ) − ci.
On the left-hand side, we have the marginal social beneﬁt of a student receiving
country-speciﬁc education. This is independent of ability. On the right-hand side,
we have the marginal social beneﬁt of a student receiving internationally applicable
education. This value is increasing in the student’s ability. The ﬁrst-order condition
17allows us to solve for the cutoﬀ level of ability below which the government provides




ρ − cs + ci
ρ[1 − pA + pAbA(1 − τ)α + pAbAτg]
− e
A. (9)
Comparative statics yield that investment in education i is increasing in cs and α
and decreasing in ci and β,a s∂eA/∂β < 0. Correspondingly, the ﬁrst-order condition
of the SWF
B




xρ − xcs + xci
ρ[(1 − pB)x + pBbB(1 − τ)α + pBbBτg]
− e
B. (10)
A general result with graduate taxes is derived.
Proposition 1 Governments invest more in internationally applicable education with
graduate taxes than with only domicile-based taxation. Investment in internationally
applicable education is increasing in the graduate tax rate.
Proof. Insert (7) into (9) and (8) into (10). The ﬁrst terms on the right-hand side
of the resulting expressions are decreasing in τg, while the second terms are independent
of it.
Notice that this result is independent of the weight assigned to emigrants, and of
the relative importance of private investment in eﬀort. A central result is then:
Proposition 2 Allowing member states to levy graduate taxes is welfare improving.
Proof. See Appendix.
184.2. International applicability and education policy
While the analysis of the welfare eﬀects of graduate taxes yields general results,
welfare eﬀects of changes in the international applicability parameter γ are more diﬃ-
cult to determine. To simplify, the analysis focuses on two polar cases: a federation of
two symmetric member states, and an asymmetric federation in which migration goes
only from the poor to the rich member state.
An increase in international applicability of human capital encourages private in-
vestment in it. Given that private and public investments are complementary, this
would leave the eﬀect of an increased international applicability of education i on pub-
lic investment in it a priori unclear. On one hand, brain drain eﬀe c tw o u l dp u s ht h e
government to reduce public investment in it, while brain gain eﬀect would render
investing in it more attractive. Remarkably, this analysis ﬁnds that the brain drain
eﬀect always dominates in public investment, provided that the government cares only
about its citizens staying.
Proposition 3 If α = τg =0and x =1 , then governments always reduce investment
in internationally applicable education when its applicability increases.
Proof. See Appendix.
Due to the presence of the brain gain eﬀect, however, the aggregate stock of interna-
tionally applicable human capital may either increase or decrease when its international
applicability increases:
Proposition 4 If α = τg =0and x =1 , then an increase in the applicability of inter-
nationally applicable education may result in either a larger or smaller pre-migration
stock of it.
19Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 4 suggests that in addition to the cost of private eﬀort, β,a l s oa b i l i t y
distribution plays an important role in determining whether an increase in interna-
tional applicability of internationally applicable human capital increases or decreases
its formation. The intuition is as follows. If the density of abilities around the marginal
ability of internationally applicable education is low, then the negative eﬀect at the
extensive margin from reduced public provision is small, and the positive eﬀect from
the increased private eﬀo r ta tt h ei n t e n s i v em a r g i nd o m i n a t e s .O nt h eo t h e rh a n d ,i f
the density of abilities around the cutoﬀ level is high, then an increase in the mini-
mum ability above which the government provides internationally applicable education
excludes a large number of students, and the extensive margin may dominate.
Importantly, an increased mobility of labor need not always reduce total resources
used to ﬁnance education. Whether this is the case or not depends on which type
of education is more expensive. Also when internationally applicable education is
less expensive, an increased probability of migration reduces individual government’s
incentives to invest in it.
When the government attaches the same weight to emigrants as to citizens staying,
increased mobility may lead to either a larger or smaller investment in internationally
applicable education. On the one hand, eﬃciency gains from brain exchange for emi-
grants encourage governments to invest more in internationally applicable education.
On the other hand, governments are pushed toward less investment because they lose
tax revenue from emigrants.
Proposition 5 Assume that x =1 . Governments with a suﬃciently high α may
increase investment in internationally applicable education when its applicability in-
20creases, provided that τw is not too high. Ceteris paribus, a decrease in β widens the
scope for the government to increase investment in i when γ increases.
Proof. To prove its existence, set τw =0 , cs = ci, x =1and α =1in (9), after
inserting (7). Then diﬀerentiating yields ∂b aA
t /∂γ < 0 by γ ≥ 2/3. Without restrictions
on the value of τw, cs,o rci, ∂2b aA
t /∂γ∂β > 0 in (9).
The latter ﬁnding relates to results by Stark et al. (1997) and Stark and Wang
(2002): a positive probability of migration encourages private investments in human
capital. The results of this analysis arise from a common labor market of two symmetric
countries. Previous literature on brain drain and brain gain has focused on migration
from a less developed country to a more developed country. (See Stark et al. (1997),
Beine et al. (2001) and Stark and Wang (2002))
Assume next an asymmetric federation with γx ≤ 2/3. Parallel to the analysis of
as y m m e t r i cf e d e r a t i o n ,
Proposition 6 If α = τg =0and γx ≤ 2/3, the government of member state B
always reduces investment in internationally applicable education when its applicability
increases.
Proof. See Appendix.
This proposition shows that even as brain gain from the possibility of migration
intensiﬁes, the government of the poorer member state still reduces its investment in
internationally applicable human capital, as its applicability increases. Interestingly,
Proposition 7 An increased probability of emigration from member state B to member
s t a t eA ,r e s u l t i n gf r o ma ni n c r e a s ei nγ or a decrease in x, may either increase or
decrease welfare in member state A when α = τg =0and γx ≤ 2
3.
21Proof. See Appendix.
To summarize, the welfare eﬀects of international applicability may be non-monotonic.
Also the member state beneﬁting from immigration may be hurt if its attractiveness
increases too much, relative to the other member state. The reason why an increase
in the mobility of labor from the poorer to the richer member state may decrease wel-
fare in the richer member state hinges on the policy response of the government in
the poorer member state. If a further increase in the probability of emigration results
in the government of the poorer member state switching to oﬀering country-speciﬁc
education, the richer member state suﬀers also as it no longer receives immigrants and
t h et a xr e v e n u et h e yw o u l do ﬀer.
5. Conclusion
This paper shows that decentralized decision-making on public education encour-
ages the member states of the European Union to distort the provision of public ed-
ucation away from internationally applicable education, toward country-speciﬁc skills.
If governments focus on the utility of those citizens (and voters) who stay, they reduce
the provision of internationally applicable education even when students would increase
complementary private investment in eﬀort. This analysis thus suggests that the brain
drain eﬀect would dominate the brain gain, at the extensive margin of a government
deciding how many students it provides internationally applicable education. At the
intensive margin of students deciding on their complementary private investment in
eﬀort, an increase in international applicability results in more eﬀort. The net eﬀect
c a nt h e ng oe i t h e rw a y .
Whether the behavioral responses at the intensive margin by students or at the ex-
tensive margin by governments dominate, behavioral responses at the extensive margin
22lead to ineﬃciently low number of students receiving internationally applicable educa-
tion. As a remedy, this study suggests introducing graduate taxes or income-contingent
loans, paid according to the same rules independently of future domicile. Giving mem-
berstates astake ineﬃciency gains also earned elsewhere would encourage governments
to invest more in human capital beneﬁting also the other member states. The enlarge-
ment of the European Union increases potential beneﬁts of establishing graduate taxes
or income-contingent loans. With current tax rules, incentives of citizens and those
of governments would diverge. Students would ﬁnd incentives to study for migration,
thanks to higher expected earnings elsewhere. Governments, on the other hand, would
face incentives to educate students to stay, by oﬀering them too little internationally
applicable human capital, and too many country-speciﬁc skills.
This analysis relies on several simplifying assumptions, some of which should not
change the underlying results, while others can be expected to aﬀect policy conclusions.
It assumes that production technologies are linear in the two types of human capital.
This implies that wages of a given occupation do not change as a result of changes
in the number of those educated in that occupation. This assumption should not
aﬀect any qualitative results. This paper analyzes the eﬀects of marginal changes in
international applicability or graduate tax rates. Any changes in the relative wage
rates are induced eﬀects of changes in the relative stocks, and are thus induced second-
order eﬀects. A quantitative analysis of non-marginal changes should, naturally, aim at
capturing complementarities and substitutabilities in production. Also, tax rates are
taken as given, following Keen and Marchand (1997). Endogenizing these tax rates is
left for future research, as are possible interactions that such tax rates or educational
investments could have with public provision of infrastructure.
Perhaps the most important assumption is that the governments are benevolent,
23and do not suﬀer from the time-consistency problem. In the analyzed model with
benevolent governments and without the commitment problem, there is no motivation
for relying on income-contingent loans, as opposed to graduate taxes. Allowing for a
commitment problem or governments which are not entirely benevolent would likely
to change this. In a world where the benevolence of governments is not universally
guaranteed, constitutional design has to trade-oﬀ the adverse selection problem and the
need to tame Leviathan governments. Accepting a certain degree of adverse selection
would then be optimal, and could be interpreted as a federation’s insurance premium
against potential abuses by governments. Voluntary contracts would also solve the
time-consistency problem that may arise even when governments are benevolent.
Appendix.
Proof of Proposition 2.
Welfare eﬀects of education policy of either member state can be divided into inter-
nalized eﬀects and externalities on the other member state. Country-speciﬁce d u c a t i o n
does not generate externalities, while internationally applicable education generates a
positive externality to the other member state as the other member state beneﬁts from
migrants who pay wage taxes there. By Proposition 1, an increase in the graduate tax
rate increases the provision of internationally applicable education. As either country
could have left its education policy unchanged, both countries perceive their own social
welfare to increase as a result of providing more internationally applicable education.
But as this increases also the welfare of the other member state, it clearly increases the
sum of welfare in the two member states.
Proof of Proposition 3.





























The ﬁrst term is positive, and the second negative. Notice that when both types of
education are provided, social surplus from providing education s has to exceed that
from providing education i with a =0 .T h a ti s ,ρ−cs > (1−pA)ρeA −ci. By (3) and
(7), this implies that




























4 > 0. This condition always holds as γ ≤ 1.
Proof of Proposition 4.
It is useful to write the stock of internationally applicable human capital explicitly
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T h el a s tl i n eu s e s( 9 )a n d( 7 ) . T h eﬁrst term is negative as ∂b aj(γ)/∂γ > 0 by
Proposition 3. The second term is positive by γ>2/3.I f f(b aj(γ)) → 0,t h eﬁrst
25term vanishes. Then the second term dominates, and ∂ e H
j
i/∂γ > 0.I fβ →∞ ,t h e n
∂ e H
j
i/∂γ < 0 by Proposition 3.
Proof of Proposition 6.
With α = τg =0and (8), (10) simpliﬁes to
b a
B =
























This is positive if and only if



















On the other hand, we have a requirement that in order to have any country-speciﬁc
education being provided, it must hold that the expected social surplus from providing
this exceeds that of providing internationally applicable education for a citizen with
zero ability. That is, ρx − xcs >ρ (1 − pB)xeB − xci. Inserting yields





























26The left-hand sides of (A3) and (A4) are identical. (A4) thus implies that (A3)


























This simpliﬁes as 9
16+ x3
γ3 − 3x2
4γ2 > 0.I fx ≥ γ,t h i sa l w a y sh o l d sa st h es u mo ft h et w o
last terms is positive. Assume next that x<γ . To simplify notation, deﬁne y ≡ x/γ,
noting that 0 <y<1. What remains to prove is that g(y)= 9
16 + y3 − 3
4y2 > 0∀y ∈
(0,1).D i ﬀerentiating g(y),w eﬁnd that it is decreasing in the area to be studied when
y<1
2, and increasing when y>1
2.I tt h u ss u ﬃces to study the value of the function
at y = 1
2.A sg(1
2)=1
2,t h ec l a i mi sp r o v e n .
Proof of Proposition 7.
Assume ﬁrst that the probability of migration from B to A is zero. Then an increase
clearly beneﬁts the member state A as it receives tax revenue from immigrants. If,
however, the probability of migration increases to one and α is suﬃciently low, then the
government of member state B stops investment in internationally applicable education.
Thus, an increase in γ (or a decrease in x) improves welfare in member state A when
migration is suﬃciently small, but reduces welfare in member state A when migration
is suﬃciently large.
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